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Has Devolution Changed the 'British Policy Style'? 
Abstract
1
 
The term ‘policy style’ simply means the way that governments make and implement 
policy. Yet, the term ‘British policy style’ may be confusing since it has the potential to 
relate to British exceptionalism or European convergence. Lijphart’s (1977; 1999) 
important contribution identifies the former.  It sets up a simple distinction between 
policy styles in majoritarian and consensual democracies and portrays British policy 
making as top down and different from a consensual European approach. In contrast, 
Richardson (1982) identifies a common ‘European policy style’.  This suggests that 
although the political structures of each country vary, they share a ‘standard operating 
procedure’ based on two factors – an incremental approach to policy and an attempt to 
reach a consensus with interest groups rather than impose decisions.  This article extends 
these arguments to British politics since devolution.  It questions the assumption that 
policy styles are diverging within Britain. Although consultation in the devolved 
territories may appear to be more consensual, they are often contrasted with a caricature 
of the UK process based on atypical examples of top-down policy making.   While there 
may be a different ‘feel’ to participation in Scotland and Wales, a similar logic of 
consultation and bureaucratic accommodation exists in the UK.  This suggests that, 
although devolution has made a difference, a British (or European) policy style can still 
be identified. 
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Introduction 
Richardson’s (1982) Policy Styles in Western Europe explored the extent to which policy 
making styles were convergent or divergent.  It suggested that although Britain’s 
predisposition towards consultation with interest groups seemed to contrast with France’s 
secrecy and Sweden’s rationalism, beyond the caricatures there was a ‘close family 
resemblance … a European policy style’ (Richardson et al, 1982: 1).  Although the 
political structures in these countries varied, they shared a ‘standard operating procedure’ 
that transcended national boundaries. Formulation and implementation processes 
highlighted more similarities than differences, with attempts to impose polices from the 
top-down relatively rare and interest groups central to the process in most countries.  
 
One aim of the Richardson discussion was to explore academic assumptions regarding 
the UK’s ‘majoritarian’ label (Lijphart, 1977; 1999) and challenge the idea that the 
British policy style was exceptional.   For Lijphart, policy styles flow from electoral 
systems and the distribution of power.  Under proportional systems, power is dispersed 
across parties, encouraging the formation of coalitions based on common aims.  This 
spirit of ‘inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise’ extends to the relationships between 
group and government, with groups more likely to cooperate with each other and 
governments more willing to form corporatist alliances (Lijphart, 1999: 2-3).  In contrast, 
the plurality system exaggerates governing majorities; control of the legislature is held by 
a single party and power is concentrated within government.  This asymmetry of power 
extends to the group-government arena, with groups more likely to compete with each 
other and governments more likely to impose policy from the top-down.   
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For Richardson, Gustafsson and Jordan (1982), the British policy style was not as ‘top-
down’ as many accounts suggested.  Rather, the UK shared a common style with a range 
of political systems, based on the need of civil servants to gather information from 
interest groups and legitimise decisions through consultation.  The ‘logic of consultation’ 
(Jordan and Maloney, 1997) with the most affected interests is strong since it encourages 
group ownership of policy and maximises governmental knowledge of possible 
problems.  Further, the size of the state and scope for ‘overload’ necessitates breaking 
policy down into more manageable sectors and sub-sectors which are less subject to top-
down control.       
 
Therefore, the call was for more evidence on, rather than assumptions of, the British 
policy style.  This became particularly important during a Thatcher era that was widely 
assumed to be marked by conviction politics (fostered by a majoritarian system), the 
rejection of consultation and the imposition of policy (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a: 8).  
Subsequent debates on the nature of consultation demonstrated that the British policy 
style was complex and varied over time, sector and issue.  Although consultation 
appeared to be rejected at a ministerial level, it was often merely displaced to other parts 
of the government machine (Cairney, 2002).  There were still close relationships between 
groups and government and a ‘top-down’ process only accounted for a small proportion 
of the ‘British style’.  These points were rediscovered in the  literature that critiques 
discussions of Blair’s ‘Presidentialism’ (see Bevir and Rhodes, 2006) and Kriesi, Adam 
and Jochum’s (2006: 357) study which suggests that UK policy networks still resemble 
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those found in consensus democracies.  Yet, the identification of widespread consultation 
does not resolve debates regarding the quality of consultation and the influence of groups 
with limited access to ministers.  While some argue that most decision making take place 
in sub-sectoral policy networks (Jordan et al, 1994; Jordan, 2005), others highlight the 
limits placed on this process by decisions made at the sectoral level (Cavanagh et al, 
1995; Marsh et al, 2001; see also Richardson, 2000). 
 
More recent developments in the UK suggest a need to re-engage with this debate.  
Devolution has created three new executives with the potential for their own policy style 
based on the type of consensus politics associated with proportional systems (although 
the limited experience of devolution undermines analysis of Northern Ireland – see 
Keating, Cairney and Hepburn, 2008 for a preliminary discussion).  Further, its 
introduction coincided with hopes in Scotland and Wales for a new style of politics, 
‘radically different from the rituals of Westminster: more participative, more creative, 
less needlessly confrontational’ (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995).  This 
included moves in Scotland to oblige its executive to consult wider than the ‘usual 
suspects’ (SCC, 1995) and in Wales towards a formal commitment to consult with 
partnership councils in the business, union and voluntary sectors (Entwistle, 2006).  More 
importantly, this ‘new politics’ reflected a close bond between ‘civil society’ and political 
parties which built up during the campaigns for devolution and was expected to continue 
beyond 1999 (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008).   
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The evidence suggests that many of these hopes were realised.  An extensive series of 
interviews with interest groups (professional, voluntary, business, trade union, religious) 
and civil servants in Scotland and Wales from 1999-2007 (approximately 200) suggests 
that close partnerships have developed, with groups reporting high levels of satisfaction 
when engaging with government (Keating et al, 2008; Keating and Stevenson, 2001; 
Keating, 2005a).
2
  Further, most interviewees in Scotland and Wales contrast this process 
with the ‘Presidential’ style that they associate with the UK government.  Therefore, the 
potential irony of diverging policy styles is that the UK is the only government to reject 
the British (and European) policy style identified by Richardson.
3
   
 
The main problem with this assumption is that it may be based on the same caricatures of 
majoritarian versus consensus government that Lijphart (1999) identifies and Richardson 
et al (1982) question, particularly since the groups interviewed since devolution may 
have limited experience of the UK arena.   In other words, too many assumptions are still 
being made about the nature of UK policy making.  This article extends the empirical 
analysis to interviews conducted with equivalent UK interest groups and civil servants in 
the ‘most devolved’ policy areas (health, education, local government).  Approximately 
70 interviews were conducted from 2006-7 and similar questions – on the nature and 
frequency of contact with ministers and civil servants – were asked.  This evidence 
suggests that while there may be a different ‘feel’ to participation in Scotland and Wales, 
a similar logic of consultation and bureaucratic accommodation exists in the UK.  This 
does not mean that there are no differences, particularly since devolved groups appear to 
enjoy more routine access to ministers and the most senior civil servants. Rather, the 
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article suggests that we should not make assumptions about the UK policy process based 
on these differences (which perhaps say more about the vagaries of devolution than about 
differences between consensus and majoritarian systems).     
 
Therefore, the aim of this article is to situate the evidence on diverging styles within the 
literature on UK governance and policy networks.  It questions the assumption that the 
UK government style was, and is, top-down and majoritarian.  This allows us to make a 
more detailed assessment of the impact that devolved differences make.  For example, we 
can apply this new evidence to longstanding discussions linking consultation to influence.  
The identification of devolved consultation practices with routine access to the ‘top’ 
allows us to compare levels of influence with a UK process characterised by routine 
consultation at relatively low levels of government (in part as a response to the relatively 
large state with more need for sectorisation).  In other words: does greater access to the 
‘top’ translate to more influence overall?  As a whole, the evidence provides more than 
one picture of UK consultation and reinforces the argument that broad conclusions on 
‘majoritarian’ systems must be qualified by detailed empirical investigation.   
 
Defining a Common Policy Style 
According to Jordan and Richardson (1982: 3), the ‘normal’ style of government in 
Britain contains three main elements: 
 
1. A ‘predilection for consultation’ with interest groups; 
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2. A ‘strong desire to avoid actions which might challenge well entrenched 
interests’; and, 
3. The ‘avoidance of radical policy change’. 
 
This style is similar to Western Europe on the basis of two factors:  
 
1. A reactive, not anticipatory, approach to policy (or incremental rather than 
rationalist); and  
2. An attempt to reach a consensus with interest groups rather than impose 
decisions.   
 
The focus of this article is the latter.  While different countries display differences in 
culture or formal style, this masks ‘inner-circle negotiation’ with the pressure participants 
that really ‘matter’.  The focus on policy styles highlights a powerful logic to consultation 
between civil servants and interest groups. Under this logic the most affected interests are 
involved, to encourage ownership of policy and maximise governmental knowledge of 
possible problems (Richardson et al, 1982: 2).  There is also a functional logic since the 
size of the state and scope for ‘overload’ necessitates breaking policy down into 
manageable sectors and sub-sectors.  Ministers and senior civil servants devolve the bulk 
of decision-making to less senior officials who consult with pressure participants and 
exchange access for resources such as expertise and advice.  While decisions are referred 
back up the chain, the sheer number of decisions and the expertise required to analyse 
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them is often prohibitive.  This is magnified by the incentive of participants to ‘frame’ 
issues as humdrum to fend off attention (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).   
 
Bureaucratic accommodation within policy communities is not the only style.  Marsh and 
Rhodes (1992b) position policy communities at one extreme of a spectrum of policy 
network types, arguing that the assumptions involved (limited memberships, good quality 
access, shared values and a relationship based on the exchange of resources) contrast with 
issue networks (less control over participants, infrequent access, ad hoc conflict and less 
negotiation) at the other (see Heclo, 1978).  Jordan and Richardson (1982: 98) also 
discuss instances in which the process will diverge from the ‘normal’ style: ‘competition 
inside government’ for high profile decisions, policy-making within parties and issues in 
which the government delays its own involvement.   They also describe issues not suited 
to this style: constitutional issues which lack the usual intensity of group interest; value-
changing policies in which wider public campaigns are required to alter social attitudes, 
and non-negotiable/ manifesto policies.  Further, since the size of the state necessitates 
sectorisation, different policy styles may develop in different sectors.  Or, the nature of 
policy (distributive versus regulatory; innovation versus revision) may affect styles 
(Hogwood, 1986).     
 
However, the dominant or ‘normal’ style is to, “avoid electoral politics and public 
conflict in order to reach consensus or ‘accommodation’ in the … consultative 
machinery” (Jordan and Richardson, 1982: 80-1).   Since ‘command decisions are 
politically expensive’, the aim is to process as much policy as possible outwith the 
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‘already crowded political agenda’ (Richardson et al, 1982: 10).  Most policy is 
processed in less visible and less contentious arenas despite a tendency for case studies to 
focus on ‘spectacular’ policy activity (Richardson 1982: 199).  This is echoed by Rose 
(1986: 305) who suggests that a focus by ministers on a handful of policy issues means 
giving little attention to the remainder of government.  Therefore, the idea of a normal 
style does not preclude a level of high-profile decision-making by ministers not relying 
on the usual channels. Rather, this process should be placed within the wider context of 
government. Policymaking should not be equated with these atypical, politically 
contentious themes that dominate media attention.  The majority of public policy is a 
collection of decisions deemed ‘minor or detailed or insignificant’ which are made by 
middle ranking civil servants in ‘specialist niches occupied by particularised interest 
groups’ (Jordan, 2005: 317).    
 
 
Policy Styles from Thatcher to Blair: Presidentialism versus Governance  
The aim of Richardson et al’s discussion was to question the assumption that the British 
process was somehow different from other European countries, particularly during the 
Thatcher era.  Top-down caricatures contrasted with the literature stressing the logic of 
consultation, producing a puzzling picture of falling and rising consultation.  Marsh and 
Rhodes (1992a: 8) describe a period in which government appeared to eschew 
consultation, making policy choices ‘unencumbered by the constraints provided by 
interest groups’ and Marsh et al (2001: 190) confirm, ‘a decrease in consultation in the 
Conservative years’.  Yet, Jordan and Richardson (1987: 30) were ‘impressed with the 
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sheer weight of consultation’ in their interviews with civil servants, while Maloney et al 
(1994: 23) report that ‘the practice of consultation has been growing in importance’.   We 
have several possible solutions to this puzzle.  First, we can distinguish between quantity 
and quality: the rise may be associated with cosmetic consultation or the rules of 
engagement may have changed, with the government more likely to set the agenda in 
which consultation takes place (Marsh et al, 2001: 189; Baggott, 1995; Richardson, 2000: 
1010).  However, there has never been a consistent survey of the consultation process 
over time to demonstrate these assumptions.   
 
Second, the authors reach different conclusions depending on where they look for 
evidence.  This may involve different sectors, with Marsh et al (2001: 190) noting the 
drop in contact between trade unions and the Department of Employment while Maloney 
et al (1994) identify enduring relationships in agriculture.  Or, they may have different 
views on the level of government at which consultation is most valuable.  While Jordan et 
al (1994: 524) highlight the pervasiveness of internally fragmented bureaucracies at the 
sub-sectoral level, Cavanagh et al (1995) argue that these networks follow the agenda set 
by the sector.  This suggests that consultation is rejected at the sectoral level (Richardson, 
2000: 1010) but diverted to lower levels of government (Cairney, 2002).  Since the bulk 
of government policy is administered by civil servants, with ministers focusing on the 
‘non-routine and exceptional’ (Rose, 1986: 304), the rejection of consultation by 
ministers will not reduce overall consultation levels.  The focus of analysis therefore 
becomes the extent to which consensus reached in sub-sectoral policy communities is 
sustainable when 
 
(or if) exposed to wider political processes.  In this analysis we trade 
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off the exaggeration of sectoral-level influence (by focusing on ‘spectacular’ examples) 
against a faith that most policy-making is humdrum and observable but not observed.   
 
A third element relates to the ability of the centre to implement policy without relying on 
a range of interests.  Bevir and Rhodes (2003: 6) suggest that what we are witnessing is 
not successful centralisation, but the pursuit of top-down policy which is likely to be 
confounded by fragmentation and interdependence or follows from an attempt to address 
previous implementation problems.  For example, during the development of market-
driven healthcare reforms in the late 1980s (as a response to a funding crisis), Thatcher 
took charge of small review team which consulted with no-one (Burch and Holliday, 
1996: 233).  When the plans ran out of momentum they were passed onto the Department 
of Health and processed through more usual channels.  While the Health Secretary 
initially pushed the legislation through Parliament in the face of medical opposition, his 
successor took a more conciliatory approach to ensure successful implementation 
(Cairney, 2002).  Such examples suggest that while we may identify instances of top-
down policy-making, these form part of a wider cycle of decision-making in which 
consultation is displaced rather than rejected.  While the centre ‘sets the agenda’ for that 
contact, its ability (and inclination) to monitor its own agenda is often limited.   
 
These arguments may apply more today than they did during the Thatcher era.  First, 
Richards and Smith (2004: 106) suggest that Labour recognised the problem of 
governance before its election, with the Modernisation agenda seeking solutions based on 
trust and networks.  The focus on top-down styles and hierarchies came in Labour’s 
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second term of office following frustration with a lack of progress.  It is only then that 
cross-cutting targets coordinated from No.10 were transferred to the Treasury and more 
strongly linked with the control of expenditure.  This suggests that policy styles may be 
cyclical rather than consistently top-down.  Second, as Marsh et al (2001: 194) suggest, 
Labour’s election met with a ‘major increase in consultation’, particularly with voluntary 
sector groups who had helped them during opposition (see also Kendall, 2000).   Third, 
Rhodes (2005) suggests that top civil servants still devote very little time to substantive 
policy development, while Page (2006: 4) re-affirms the importance of policy production 
by ‘people initially assumed to be rather routine workers in bureaucracy’.  Top-down 
policy direction is often ‘extremely broad’ - with most civil servants unable to engage the 
interest of their superiors - and the level of government knowledge of the issue is low.  
Most policy is produced by low-ranking civil servants searching for cues from groups.   
 
Combining these studies suggests that the policy styles identified by Richardson and 
Jordan still exist because: (a) the size and scope of the state will always require 
sectorisation and delegation; and (b) the formal concentration of power in Britain tends to 
be used, ‘with a certain informal restraint’ (Adam and Kriesi, 2007: 140).  This picture is 
confirmed by recent studies of interest groups and policy networks in the UK.  A survey 
by Page (1999: 209) suggests that 40% of (314) respondents had (at least) monthly 
contact with departments, were consulted most of the time on statutory instruments and 
felt that departments usually or sometimes make changes they suggest (67% met two of 
these three requirements). Further, Kriesi, Adam and Jochum’s (2006: 357) study of 
seven West European Countries suggests that: ‘British policy networks turned out to be 
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quite fragmented, resembling more closely those expected for consensus than for 
majoritarian democracies’.  Although there were variations in style, these related more to 
sector than territory (2006: 358).  Therefore, we should be cautious about assuming that 
headline-grabbing top-down measures are representative of the UK style.       
 
In effect, we have two competing narratives of the UK style.  The first highlights the 
imposition of policy from the top which sets the agenda for implementation and suggests 
that most consultation at lower levels is cosmetic.  Access to the top – and therefore 
interest group influence - is limited.  The second suggests that the imposition of policy is 
unusual and that most attempts to control implementation on that basis have failed.  The 
details of policy are negotiated at low levels of government and this is where most 
interest group influence is exerted.  Therefore, greater access to the ‘top’ may not 
translate to more influence overall.  
 
This provides the context for policy styles since devolution.  Most interviewees in 
Scotland and Wales refer to the first narrative.  They identify consensus politics in their 
systems that they assume contrasts with the UK in which the process is more formal, 
ministers and civil servants are more aloof, and more policy is imposed.  This view is 
also articulated in Greer and Jarman’s (2008) review of the devolution literature - the 
English style is top-down with ‘consultation limited in many important decisions’.  Yet, 
an image of top-down policy making across the board is at odds with the European style 
identified in this article.  It also seems to contradict the views of most interviewees in 
England who identify top-down styles in some issues, but as part of a much wider (and 
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less public) process associated with the second narrative.  Therefore, while there are 
differences in policy styles between Scotland, Wales and England, they are much more 
nuanced (and in need of much more examination) than the first narrative suggests.   
 
Consensus in Scotland and Wales: Hopes and Limitations 
In Scotland there was hope attached to the term ‘new politics’ as a departure from the 
caricature of ‘old Westminster’ (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995). Widened 
participation was a means to bypass reliance on the ‘usual suspects’ (the powerful interest 
groups which crowded out the rest) and to counter internalised policy formulation (SCC, 
1995).  In practice, most groups are positive about the new arrangements.  The process is 
more ‘open and consultative’ and groups point to the ease of access, with civil servants 
and ministers a ‘phone call away’.  Many refer to their pre-consultative position, 
receiving a phone call from the relevant civil servant looking for advice before a formal 
consultation is issued (Keating and Stevenson, 2001).  In Wales, there are fewer groups 
with closer access and it is common to refer to a Welsh policy ‘family’.  In many areas 
formal face-to-face consultations include all key stakeholders in one room.    Informally, 
groups are afforded similar access to civil servants, although often the unions’ first 
contact is the minister, with the outcome of meetings then passed down to civil servants 
(reflecting the importance of union links to the Labour party). 
 
Devolution has therefore opened up new consultation processes which are structured 
according to territory as well as sector.  Further, the evidence from interviewees (relating 
particularly to senior-level access) suggests that devolved consultation processes differ 
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from those in the UK (Keating, Cairney and Hepburn, 2008; Keating 2005a; McGarvey 
and Cairney, 2008).  However, several factors suggest that these differences are based on 
a complex set of relationships which are worthy of further investigation, rather than based 
on a cultural shift associated with consensus (not majoritarian) democracies. First, 
systematic differences may be explained better by necessity and size.  Wales shares with 
Scotland a greater need to consult based on low policy capacity and a heightened 
‘rationality deficit’ (Habermas, 1976 in Jordan and Richardson, 1982: 84).  The legacy of 
the Scottish Office is a civil service engaged in implementation rather than formulation.  
The successor Scottish Executive lacked capacity and relied heavily on outside interests 
for information.  This combined with a smaller political arena (with closer personal 
contacts and easier coordination) explains the Scottish style (Keating, 2005a: 106).  In 
Wales, the lack of capacity is more pronounced, with a greater reliance on pressure 
participants.  In contrast, although Whitehall enjoys more capacity, its senior decision-
makers have less ability to maintain close implementation networks.  By necessity they 
rely on the delegation of responsibility combined with measures to ensure accountability.  
This raises the possibility that the UK government uses more top-down measures but 
devolved policy is more centralised.  In Wales and Scotland the pressure participant 
population is relatively small, allowing ministers and civil servants to personally manage 
policy communities.  In England the terrain is vast and divided into more manageable 
sub-sectors.  It is at this level of government that personal policy-based relationships 
(more satisfying to groups) develop.   
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Second, comparisons are based on a misrepresented picture of closed government in the 
UK (Jordan and Stevenson, 2000).  The barriers to entry have always been low.  
Consultation lists are large and groups are generally included.  The process therefore 
becomes ‘cosmetic’; a ‘trawling exercise’ with low level civil service involvement 
(Grant, 2000).  This prompts Maloney et al (1994: 32) to distinguish between ‘peripheral 
insider’ groups (engaged but not influential in the process) with core or specialist insiders 
who enjoy more frequent and fruitful contact.  This is relevant to Scotland and Wales 
where groups report better access but, ‘claim that it is still too early to tell whether the 
consultation process offers them any real influence’ (Keating and Stevenson, 2001). In 
more recent interviews, some respondents are still reticent on the link between access and 
influence, suggesting that it is ‘easy to speak to the civil service but not to change things’.   
For others, there is growing discussion of ‘pre-consultation’ akin to Jordan and 
Richardson’s ‘inner-circle’ negotiations.  In either case, the evidence points to common 
elements within Britain: the identification of broad ‘issue networks’ with widespread but 
cosmetic involvement and smaller policy communities with more meaningful access.  In 
each country there is no easy way to quantify the type of influence that groups enjoy.   
 
This difficulty qualifies devolved group perceptions of their influence compared to their 
counterparts in the UK.  These are based on the size of the pressure participant population 
in England which ironically gives an impression of less consultation.  In other words, 
there appear to be fewer ‘winners’ but more ‘losers’ to highlight their lack of influence, 
particularly since there is a greater need for sectorisation (causing some groups to be key 
insiders in some departments but ‘irrelevant’ in others – Page, 1999: 211).  In Scotland 
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and Wales, while groups may feel more included there is still a process of winning and 
losing.  In part, this relates to the irony of capacity: while devolution presents the best 
opportunity to exchange resources for influence, pressure participants may not have the 
capacity to exploit it.  Much depends on the status of groups before devolution, with 
independent groups reporting fewer problems than devolved arms of UK organisations 
with insufficient organisational devolution (approximately half of all Scottish groups – 
Keating, 2005a: 65). Some may have one member of staff with no research capacity.  So, 
for example, the biggest winner in Wales is local government which is most able to 
engage with the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) and is crucial to the 
implementation of policy.  Interviewee perceptions are also based on the effects of 
interest group devolution, or the ability of devolved arms to lobby on their own terms 
rather than seek influence through a parent group.  They are comparing their influence 
now with their lack of influence before devolution, rather than the influence their UK 
counterparts enjoyed.  Similarly, independent groups are comparing their access in 
devolved territories with their UK experience of competition with groups who had more 
resources.  Therefore, devolution may be as much about reducing competition as 
widening access. 
 
Third, the majority/ consensus distinction does not allow us to compare differences 
between Scotland and Wales.  Yet, as Adam and Kriesi (2007: 139) suggest, a nation’s 
institutional structure will not predict the nature of group-government relations without 
reference to the ‘administrative arena’ which includes not only the strength of 
governments and their attitudes to groups, but also the strength of groups and their ability 
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to make binding decisions on behalf of their constituencies.  This varies by both sector 
and territory, particularly since policy communities are more mature in Scotland 
compared to Welsh processes (which often mark a departure from policies maintained on 
an England/ Wales basis) and there was greater Scottish ‘civil society’ (trade unions, the 
voluntary sector, education, legal and health professions) involvement in the policy 
process before devolution (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 34-6). 
 
From Hopes to Evidence in Scotland and Wales  
This point is significant in compulsory education.   In Scotland there was a longstanding 
policy community before devolution (McPherson and Raab, 1988). However, following a 
long post-war period of bureaucratic accommodation, the network came under threat 
from a UK reform agenda which included the introduction of school boards, testing and 
competition.  When Michael Forsyth attempted to introduce these policies as Scottish 
education minister in the early 1990s, the usual bureaucratic channels could not broker a 
deal between ministers and pressure participants.  Rather, the differences in Scottish 
policy – allowing teachers to decide when to test pupils and devolving minimal powers to 
school boards – developed in response to a parent, teacher and local authority campaign 
against the measures (Gillespie, 1997).  The deterioration in group-government relations 
had a knock-on effect for devolution.  Just before Labour’s election in 1997 the civil 
service was ‘virtually forbidden’ to speak to unions such as the Educational Institute of 
Scotland (interview, EIS, 2006).
 4
  This was followed by three years of ‘better but not 
deep’ relations, but then the ‘McCrone Agreement’ – a review of teachers’ pay which 
signalled a shift in group-government relations and ended a 30-year long dispute between 
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teachers and local authorities (Scottish Executive, 2001).  The McCrone review was 
lauded by interviewees for its widespread consultation and ‘teacher friendly’ language, 
while ministerial links with the EIS
5
 supplemented the overall process (the education 
minister was Jack McConnell, former teacher and future First Minister).    Excellent 
relations with teaching and local authorities then followed, driven by well-respected 
education minister (Peter Peacock) a, ‘good quality senior civil service team’ (interview, 
EIS, 2006), a ‘national debate’ which extended consultation to the public (see SPICE, 
2006) and a series of policies which were supported by the professions (including 
abolishing school boards, extending professional discretion in the new 3-18 curriculum, 
and a further rejection of ‘top-down’ inspections).  A ‘Scottish policy style’ is also 
apparent in higher education with, for example, an intensive consultation exercise before 
the announcement of student fee reform (following the Cubie report) and to discuss the 
introduction of top-up fees in England (Keating, 2005b: 428). 
 
In Wales, there were similar moves towards the rejection of testing and competition, the 
encouragement of professional discretion and the reintroduction of a local authority role.  
However, in each case the context is different:  there is no equivalent legacy of group-
government tension, the McCrone process was not possible because teachers’ pay is 
negotiated in London, and the devolution of powers to school governors since 1988 
means that the local authority role is far less strong (although overall local authority 
influence in Wales means that teaching unions do not dominate consultation).  Further, 
the new arrangements seem to marginalise civil servants.  Unlike in Scotland and 
England: 
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People go to politicians first and directly, and then it will go to us.  We have a 
working relationship with unions but if it is a major issue then they will go to the 
minister – even if there is no conflict.  This cuts out a stage of negotiation 
(interview, civil servant, Welsh Assembly Government, 2005). 
 
Interviews suggest that the Education Minister is central to most policy initiatives and 
that union satisfaction comes from excellent access (in part based on the Labour-union 
link) and a general agreement on policy.  The establishment of a separate policy network 
in Wales also allows groups to interact differently with each other.  For example, the 
competition between the three main unions (National Union of Teachers, National 
Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers and Association of Teachers 
and Lecturers) is less apparent than in England because there is constant contact and a 
broad agreement of policy.  Yet, few tests exist about the ability of unions to cooperate 
and influence policy when there is disagreement with ministers (and when the value of 
bureaucratic accommodation has not been established).  Indeed, the most significant 
disagreement – around the adequacy and transparency of funding from local authorities – 
was played out in the parliamentary arena (following the loss of Labour’s majority in 
2005, the Assembly voted against WAG to commission an independent report).  This 
displacement of policy making extended to higher education.  HE had previously 
demonstrated the ‘Welsh Way’ of consultation with a wide range of representatives on 
the review group chaired by Professor Theresa Rees.    The review was accepted by the 
WAG and National Assembly for Wales which introduced means tested grants for 
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Welsh-domiciled students.  The second Rees Review (2005) on tuition fees was 
constrained by the cross-border flows of students and staff and the knowledge that any 
deviation from English policy would have a disproportionate effect in Wales.  Its findings 
were undermined by party politics, when opposition AMs voted two days before the 
review’s recommendations were published.     
 
In health, a close relationship between ‘medical elites’ and ‘understaffed officials’ in the 
Scottish Office was apparent before devolution (Greer, 2005: 505).  Post-devolution, the 
effect of this relationship was the reversal of many internal market reforms previously 
criticized by the medical profession (see Cairney, 2002) and a shift from competition 
towards partnership working between health and local authorities.   The British Medical 
Association Scotland and Royal College of Nursing Scotland enjoy close and frequent 
access to the civil service, with lengthy pre-legislative discussions to ensure wide 
ownership of policy contrasting with their experience of legislative development before 
devolution (interviews, 2004).  Yet, if we extend analysis to different types of health 
policy, the consultation styles vary.  For example, when commissioning a mental health 
bill review, ministers gave a free reign to Bruce Millan (former Secretary of State for 
Scotland), whose two-year report was based on widespread consultation and achieved 
huge ‘ownership’ among stakeholders (Cairney, 2007a).   However, when considering 
tobacco policy reform, civil servants and ministers were reluctant to consult until their 
hand was forced by group support for a member’s bill in the Scottish Parliament 
(Cairney, 2007b).  There is also evidence of a top-down ministerial style in dental policy.  
In 2005 Lewis MacDonald was recruited as a ‘tough enforcer’ following plans to increase 
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spending substantially.  Before MacDonald’s appointment, the British Dental Association 
Scotland reported close links with the civil service.  When the extra funding was 
announced, this was accompanied by a strict definition of commitment to the NHS and 
civil servants were told to take a ‘tougher line’ with the BDA rather than negotiate 
(interview, BDA, 2006). 
 
In Wales there is less evidence of a close pre-devolution relationship.  There is also a 
similar absence of bureaucratic accommodation as education, but for different reasons.   
First, a concerted effort to alter the balance of resources from NHS targets to wider 
determinants of health followed devolution (Greer, 2004).   The practical effect is that 
doctors are less well represented than in Scotland or England.  They are often crowded 
out by wider partnerships with the local authority and voluntary sectors, with ‘political 
governance more important than clinical governance’ (interview, WAG civil servant, 
2005).  Second, there is less scope for agreement: the BMA’s response to public health 
policies is ambivalent given feedback from doctors ‘on the front line’ telling people to 
wait longer for treatment; and the first major decision was to make health boundaries 
coterminous with local authorities and oblige cross-sectoral membership of boards.   This 
exacerbated tensions associated with the widespread ‘rationalisation’ of NHS structures.  
Third, the WAG was given responsibility to develop Wales’ consultant contract and 
tensions around the implementation affected their relationship.   There are also 
personality-based tensions: while the BMA and RCN describe the immaturity of the 
Welsh civil service which still faces Whitehall, WAG civil servants criticise the BMA for 
‘marking their homework’ rather than becoming usefully engaged and a former leader of 
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the RCN for ‘trying to be the chief nursing officer for Wales’.   When relationships break 
down there is not the same Royal College structure to fall back on, and so civil servants 
look elsewhere.  When asked who they would contact on major issues such as 
rationalisation, the first response after local AMs was the Welsh Local Government 
Association (WLGA), local authority chief executives, and then locally affected 
clinicians with good links to local media.     
 
As in Scotland, there is variation by issue: in mental health service delivery there is close 
consultation between civil servants and voluntary groups such as MIND (interview, 
2005); in tobacco, close links only followed an agenda set by the Welsh Assembly 
(Cairney, 2008); and in dentistry the relationship varies according to the personality of 
the chief dental officer in the WAG (interview, BDA Wales, 2005).  Further, the example 
of free prescriptions demonstrates a lack of bureaucratic accommodation.  While 
ministers engaged in partnership meetings before policy formulation, the process was 
closed when the details of policy were determined by civil servants.  This led to costly 
errors in the regulations to stop ‘prescription tourism’ (interview, Community Pharmacy 
Wales, 2005). 
 
In Wales, the exception to the rule (of limited bureaucratic accommodation) is local 
government which enjoys extensive formal and informal contacts with WAG.  Although 
personal relationships with ministers are significant, similar relationships extend 
throughout government (interview, Welsh Local Government Association, 2005).  In 
part, this is because the WAG relies on authorities for service delivery and it trades 
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access, influence and favourable policy decisions (including the minimisation of ring-
fenced budgets) for local authority cooperation.  The WLGA is seen by most other 
groups as privileged.  This is manifest in the WLGA’s reach into a range of policy areas 
and its exemption from structural reform.  When First Minister Rhodri Morgan promoted 
the policy document Making the Connections he rejected local government reform 
because of the years of turmoil that structural changes cause.  Rather, authorities would 
be encouraged to work together.  While this accords with the permissive policy style 
identified by Greer and Jarman (2008), it seemed ironic to interviewees in further and 
higher education, health and public bodies who had been given no such commitment 
(interview, Higher Education Wales, 2005).  The issue of homelessness initially bucked 
this trend.  In the first round of consultation, groups such as Shelter Cymru (interview, 
2005) point to influence which exceeded their expectations, based on a low civil service 
capacity and crowded out local authority representation.  However, after the delivery of 
policy failed, the second round was more focussed on local authority representation. 
 
Scotland shows that the close central-local relationship may change as the powers of the 
WAG increase.  Compared to Wales there was more belief that the Scottish Executive 
used a ‘command model’ based on regular legislation and circulars, with finance 
arrangements centralised and the Executive strengthening the use of quangos and 
executive agencies to deliver policy (Bennet et al, 2002; McConnell, 2004).  Yet, the 
appearance of conflict and rejected consultation was often based on ‘staged fights’ to 
help local authorities make difficult decisions (interview, 2006).  Relationships in 
education, social work and finance are all very close (interview, Improvement Service, 
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2006).  The development of housing and homelessness policy is also similar to Wales, 
with close links initially formed with the voluntary sector, to be replaced with less 
satisfying consultation relationships as homelessness policy reached the implementation 
stage (interview, Shelter Scotland, 2004). 
 
The Evidence from the UK   
The devolution experience suggests that, although the general principle of consultation 
and partnership is followed, outcomes vary according to the maturity of the network and 
the level of bureaucratic accommodation.  Consultation styles also vary by issue and 
territory even when there is a broadly similar institutional set-up.  This suggests we pay 
more attention to the ‘administrative arena’ when considering group-government 
relationships: while the UK Government may have more power to impose policies, the 
extent to which it does so is an empirical question, informed by different narratives of 
group-government relations.  While both narratives identify top-down styles, the first 
suggests that this extends throughout the process and limits group influence, while the 
second highlights influence at relatively low levels of government.  The latter suggests 
that it is not enough to identify examples of policy making in which the group-
government relationship breaks down (particularly since there are similar examples in 
Scotland and Wales).  Rather, the aim is to examine how these cases fit into the wider 
picture.   
 
In compulsory education, Greer and Jarman (2008) support the first narrative by 
describing the imposition of competition (between private, grant maintained, academy 
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and comprehensive schools) based on key stage testing and ‘league tables’ combined 
with inspection regimes to measure quality.  This policy was closely associated with 
Tony Blair and its imposition ‘soured relations with teaching unions’ (see Keating, 2005b 
on higher education).  Further, the interview data confirms that testing is a non-negotiable 
issue, with the six main teaching unions running a critical campaign to little effect (see 
also Smithers, 2005). However, the second narrative suggests that we situate these 
practices within the more humdrum business of Whitehall departments.  For example, 
interviews with teaching unions (2006) suggest that most (the ATL, Association of 
School and College Leaders, Professional Association of Teachers and NASUWT) are 
satisfied with their relationship with government.
6
  Their gateway is the ‘social 
partnership’ which began under Education Secretary Estelle Morris as a means to 
exchange better working conditions for changes in the use of support staff.  Its remit was 
broadened and its position formalised under Charles Clarke (Bangs, 2006: 204), with the 
NUT refusing to join (it opposed the use of support staff) and the National Association of 
Head Teachers quick to leave (it felt the agreement increased head teacher workloads).  
The partnership seeks to formalise the ‘rules of the game’ which feature in policy 
networks, including the assumption that no partner (union, local authority, government) 
can speak out against policy outcomes, and that inclusion enables widespread access to 
the government’s consultative machinery: 
 
In my 1
st
 week I saw the Permanent Secretary and I said how I would like to 
operate and asked who I should see.  Now I spend 3 days per week in the DFES.  
When going from door to door there is no occasion when I don’t bump into 
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somebody!  So there is constant informal networking (interview, head teacher 
union, 2006). 
 
The partnership’s convention is one of ‘negotiating to exhaustion, with a shared 
commitment to compromise and support the outcomes’ (interview, teaching union, 2006).   
While ministers have the ‘last word’, most legitimise the work of the partnership.  In 
areas such as performance management there are sub-groups discussing the details of 
policy which receive little senior attention and demonstrate close working relationships: 
 
There were 8 of us round the table.  We met the minister once, just to sort out one 
or two difficult issues.  We needed a change in government policy and that 
happened.  If it hadn’t then we may never have met the minister on it; the civil 
servants would just get the deal signed off (interview, teaching union, 2006). 
 
Unions are also part of committees covering a wide range of subjects, including the 
school funding implementation group and the schools consultation group (discussing the 
accountability of head teachers, the structure of school improvement partners, OFSTED 
inspection frameworks, school profiles and reporting to parents).  Further, the NUT and 
NAHT still have a relationship with government.  The NUT has ‘normal’ links with 
education agencies and good experiences in contact with other departments (interview, 
2006).  Similarly, the NAHT re-engaged on the issue of recruiting and retaining head 
teachers soon after it left the partnership, and it praised the development of policy on 
pupil discipline - the Steer report’s committee was chaired by a head teacher, with the 
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majority of members from a teaching background (Department for Education and Skills, 
2006).   
 
Greer’s (2004) picture of English NHS policy contains the same elements as education: 
diversity and competition mixed with a strong focus on targets and a top-down 
‘command and control’ style.   Faith is placed in managers (with less trust in the medical 
profession) and if this is not repaid by meeting targets, managers are publicly chastised or 
sacked.  The Blair government also enhanced the purchaser/ provider split by subsuming 
GP surgeries into Primary Care Trusts which took on the commissioning responsibilities 
from strategic health authorities, providing incentives for foundation hospitals to look 
‘more private’ and increasing the market share of the private sector.    This suggests a 
consultation style which largely excludes the traditional professions and forces them to 
seek influence through criticism in the public arena.  However, beyond the headlines, we 
see a more innocuous relationship based on the trade of access for resources (helped by 
the introduction of one of the most significant pay increases for consultants and GPs): 
 
There is a lot of cooperative work that goes on.  The media will pick up only on 
the confrontation.  We have daily contact with the civil service and ministers as 
the trade union for doctors.  We also talk about professional or ‘non-political’ 
issues and will prop up the government message (interview, BMA, 2006). 
  
BMA evidence confirms the continued relevance of Eckstein’s (1960) study which 
described day-to-day contact between the government and a civil service-like BMA.  
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This extends to ‘non-negotiable’ issues such as independent treatment centres in which 
the BMA took a ‘behind the scenes’ role, providing advice on the first wave and then 
making recommendations to improve the second.  In most cases the role of ministers has 
an appreciable effect (see Headey, 1974; Marsh et al, 2001), perhaps in reflection of the 
needs of departments at different times.  For example, Alan Milburn was associated with 
the drive towards ‘command-and-control’ performance targets when waiting lists topped 
the agenda, Patricia Hewitt was an ambassadorial minister keen to foster the partnerships 
between health and local authorities necessary to deliver long-term health and social care 
policies, and Alan Johnson furthered the need to ‘keep the profession on board’ and slow 
down the process of change. 
 
The government relationship with the RCN is similar, with regular contacts between the 
health secretary and its general secretary supplemented by more frequent contact between 
the RCN’s staff and the civil service.  This relationship endured despite the poor 
reception given to the health secretary at the annual conference in 2006 (reflecting job 
losses) and the RCN’s challenge (by judicial review) to the government’s lack of 
consultation on PCTs contracting out the provision of nursing staff:
7
 
 
The day-to-day relationships have never deteriorated to the point where the 
minister won’t phone us to talk.  There is never a real standoff with government.  
We are often in discussion with people where we know we have a different 
position on X but Y is unrelated and the discussions continue (interview, RCN, 
2006). 
 30 
 
In part, this is because the RCN has a significant membership in the private sector and so 
is more careful than groups such as Unison about opposing ‘privatisation’.  Its concerns 
are directed more to the details and effects of ‘marketisation’ rather than the principle.  A 
similar picture can be painted of the NHS Confederation which represents a diverse range 
of healthcare bodies with different views (and holds resources based on its role in 
implementation).  While its members’ staff bore the brunt of the focus on targets, it is 
positive about the principle of targetry, with concern over the practical details (interview, 
NHS Confederation, 2006).   
 
As in Scotland and Wales, the consultation style varies if we extend analysis to different 
types of health policy.  However, discussions with other professions suggest that there is 
a greater feeling of exclusion based on the privileged access of medical and nursing 
groups (interview, Allied Health Professions, 2006).  The main point of contact for other 
NHS professions is the health professional officer level, with the allied health officer 
lower in seniority to the chief nursing and medical officers.  There is frustration at the 
lack of access to senior officials, particularly if the professional officer is not willing to 
present their case further up the chain.  In part this is based on the still-significant 
medical model at the sectoral level (interview, Chartered Society of Physiotherapists, 
2006).  An element of this frustration regards the lack of targets for services not 
performed by doctors, with many professions keen to see the guarantee of spending that 
accompanies them. Similar problems are discussed by the British Dental Association 
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(interview, 2006).  While sub-sectoral relationships are good, any decisions that require 
higher-level participation undermine the relationship.   
 
Perhaps the greatest demonstration of group exclusion comes in mental health.  The 
driver for change was a Home Office focus on public safety and this agenda was the 
biggest sticking point between pressure participants and government.  The Mental Health 
Alliance (with an almost complete membership of voluntary, social work and medical 
groups) was formed to counter the direction of government policy and its opposition 
hardened after each round of cosmetic consultation (the end-result was that the original 
mental health bill was withdrawn).  Yet, if we widen the analysis of mental health policy 
to other areas, the bill process is atypical. The UK has a long history of consensus in 
mental health and this continued when the government consulted on mental health 
services and the mental capacity bill (Cairney, 2007a).  These less publicised 
relationships are also apparent in tobacco policy.  For example, although the campaign 
led by ASH and the BMA to ban smoking in public places extended to the public and 
parliamentary arenas, most policy development (to introduce legislation and ensure 
Treasury support) was done behind the scenes (Cairney, 2007c).  Similarly, Cancer 
Research UK has close links based on jointly-funded research and science projects, 
Department of Health funding of CRUK-run public health campaigns and collaboration 
within the National Cancer Research Institute.   While its overt campaigning role did not 
develop until 2005, its influence as an expert was already apparent.   This reflects a 
broader form of clientelism, apparent if we shift our focus from NHS reform.   
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In local government there is also an element of consultation beyond the headlines.   
The backdrop is the Thatcher era when attempts to control local authorities by legislation 
and budget capping were accompanied by the use of quangos to bypass local authorities 
in policy delivery (Greenwood et al, 2001: 157; Stoker, 2004: 32).  The Labour 
government has furthered this agenda by fostering diversity in delivery (including the use 
of the voluntary and private sectors) and furthering tough, centrally driven targets (Greer 
and Jarman, 2008).  However, the phrase ‘top down’ presents a misleading image of the 
relationship between local authorities and Whitehall.  Consultation has risen since 
Labour’s election and the working relationship between government and the Local 
Government Association is good (interview, LGA, 2006).  It involves the formal process 
of minister-councillor contact within the Central-Local partnership which meets three 
times per year, its range of sub-committees (on shared services, performance 
management, health, etc.) which meet more frequently, day-to-day links between the 
Department of Communities and Local Government and the LGA’s staff, and 
professional links between government and the Improvement and Development Agency 
(the LGA’s sister-organisation focussed on service-led improvement).   Dissatisfaction 
does not arise from the government’s consultation style.  Rather, local authorities bemoan 
elements of policy (with a ‘big jump in centralisation’ based on the direction of spending 
linked to audit) while welcoming others (such as measures to increase diversity and 
pursue ‘double-devolution’). 
 
Conclusion 
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While most interviewees refer to a different feel to the consultation processes in Scotland 
and Wales, the evidence suggests that a common British (or European) style still exists.  
This is based on the logic of consultation and the benefits of reaching a consensus with 
interest groups rather than imposing decisions.  In the UK, while some policy issues are 
non-negotiable and minister-driven, the bulk of government business is more humdrum, 
with civil servants struggling to engage the interest of senior decision-makers and relying 
on pressure participants for advice.   There is regular and frequent contact over the 
substance and details of policy.  Therefore, although devolution has made a difference to 
consultation styles, they are more complex than the simple majoritarian/ consensus 
distinction suggests. In Scotland and Wales, although relationships appear (and often are) 
closer, we see a less mature process of bureaucratic accommodation, similar shifts of 
policy formulation outside the bureaucratic arena and occasional periods of top-down 
policy-making.  Indeed, the greater likelihood of coalition in Scotland and Wales has 
increased the scope for ‘policy-making within parties’ as a source of non-negotiable 
manifesto commitments.  The key difference may be that in the UK groups are more 
likely to be dissatisfied with policy outcomes.  Yet, the scale of participation in the UK 
(or the lack of ideological competition in Scotland and Wales) and the effect of 
sectorisation exaggerates its number of dissatisfied customers. There are winners and 
losers in all territories.   Further, in the UK the attitudes of groups to government policy 
are often ambiguous, with many bemoaning policy outcomes on the one hand but 
criticising the quality of devolved service delivery on the other.   
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Of course, there is a big difference between being consulted and being influential and 
while groups may be consulted in England, they may matter in Scotland and Wales 
(particularly since they enjoy more frequent access with ministers).  Groups in health, 
education and local government are not only called on for their technical expertise, but 
also enjoy favourable policy outcomes (based on a much greater trust in professional 
judgement in Scotland and Wales which contrasts with the pervasiveness of 
managerialism in England).   Yet, this can be qualified in two main ways.  First, much of 
the differences may result from size and policy capacity rather than a culture of 
consultation based on consensus politics.  Second, much of this difference is asserted 
rather than demonstrated and based on the idea that we can identify the ‘big’ policy 
issues and compare the influence of groups within them.  Many groups within UK policy 
communities will consider themselves successful if their issues are deemed unimportant, 
while ascribing influence is a problem inherent in all networks involving private 
negotiations and joint decision-making (Marsh et al, 2001: 196).   
 
In effect, to accept uncritically the idea of systematic differences in policy styles based on 
broad political structures is to ignore the policy making logic that pushes governments 
towards embracing and defusing those with credible expertise. To simply accept the 
views of some participants that their access is superior to that of others is to give 
credence to generalizations not tested in experience. The assertion that access is better in 
Scotland and Wales is in part the rather biased conclusions of group populations who 
pushed for devolution. Similarly, the idea that there is top down policy domination in 
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England is often the conclusion of those parts of the group world who are disappointed in 
the negotiations. 
 
References 
Adam, S. and Kriesi, H. (2007) ‘The Network Approach’ in (ed.) P. Sabatier Theories of 
the Policy Process 2
nd
 Edition (Cambridge MA: Westview Press) 
Baggot, R. (1995) ‘From Confrontation to Consultation? Pressure Group Relations From 
Thatcher to Major’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 48, 3, 484-502 
Bangs, J. (2006) ‘Social Partnership: the wider context’ FORUM, 48, 2, 201-8 
Baumgartner, F. and Jones, B. (1993) Agendas and Instability in American Politics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 
Bennett, M. J. Fairley and M. McAteer (2002) The Impact of Devolution on Local 
Government in Scotland http://www.jrf.org.uk/bookshop/eBooks/184263092x.pdf    
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R.A.W. (2003) Interpreting British Governance (London: 
Routledge) 
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R.A.W. (2006) Governance Stories (London: Routledge) 
Burch, M. and Holliday, I. (1996) The British Cabinet System  
(London: Prentice Hall/ Harvester Wheatsheaf) 
Cairney, Paul (2002), ‘New Public Management and the Thatcher Health Care Legacy: 
Enough of the Theory, What about the Implementation?’, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, Vol.4, No.3, pp.375-98. 
Cairney, P. (2007a) ‘Policy Styles, Devolution and Mental Health in Britain: Beyond the 
Headlines’, PAC Conference, Belfast, September 
 36 
Cairney, P. (2007b) ‘Using Devolution to Set the Agenda? Venue Shift and the Smoking 
Ban in Scotland’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 9: 73-89 
Cairney, P. (2007c) “A ‘Multiple Lenses’ Approach to Policy Change: the Case of 
Tobacco Policy in the UK”, British Politics, 2, 1, 45-68  
Cairney, P. (2008) ‘The Role of Ideas in Policy Transfer: The Case of UK Smoking Bans 
since Devolution’, PSA Territorial Politics conference, Edinburgh, January 2008 
http://www.pol.ed.ac.uk/events/conferences/psaterr2008/submitted_papers  
Cavanagh, M., Marsh, D. and Smith, M. (1995) “The Relationship Between Policy 
Networks at the Sectoral and Subsectoral Levels, Public Administration, 73, 627-33 
Department for Education and Skills (2006) Learning Behaviour: The Report of the 
Practitioners’ Group on School Behaviour and Discipline  (Steer Report) 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/behaviourandattendance/uploads/Learning%20Behaviour%20(pu
blished).pdf  
Eckstein, H. (1960) Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical 
Association  (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.) 
Gillespie, J. (1997) ‘National Testing – the inside story’, unpublished document. 
Grant, W. (2000) Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain 3rd ed  
(London: Philip Allen) 
Greenwood, J., Pyper, R. and Wilson, D. (2001) New Public Administration in Britain 
(London: Routledge) 
Greer, S. and Jarman, H. (2008) 'Policy Styles and Devolution' in A. Trench (ed.) The 
State of the Nations 2008 (London: Imprint Academic) 
 37 
Greer, Scott (2004), Territorial Politics and Health Policy. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Greer, S. (2005) ‘The Territorial Bases of Health Policymaking in the UK after 
Devolution’, Regional and Federal Studies, 15, 4, 501-18 
Headey, B. (1974) British Cabinet Ministers  (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd) 
Heclo, H. (1978). ‘Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment’, in A. King (ed.) 
The New American Political System (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute) 
Hogwood, B. (1986) ‘If Consultation is Everything then Maybe it’s Nothing’, Strathclyde 
Papers on Government and Politics (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde) 
Jordan, G. (2005) ‘Bringing Policy Communities Back In?  A Comment on Grant’, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7, 317-21 
Jordan, A.G. and Maloney, W.A. (1997) “Accounting for Subgovernments: Explaining 
the Persistence of Policy Communities”, Administration and Society, vol.29, 5, 557-583 
Jordan, G. and Maloney, W. (1995) ‘Policy networks expanded: a comment on 
Cavanagh, Marsh and Smith’, Public Administration 73, 630-34. 
Jordan, A.G. and Richardson, J.J. (1982) ‘The British Policy Style or the Logic of 
Negotiation?’ in (ed) Richardson Policy Styles in Western Europe (London: Allen and 
Unwin) 
Jordan, A.G. and Richardson, J.J. (1987) Government and Pressure Groups in Britain  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
Jordan G and Stevenson L (2000), "Redemocratizing Scotland. Towards the Politics of 
Disappointment?,"    in   Wright   A   (ed),   Scotland:   the   Challenge   of Devolution, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate) 
 38 
Jordan, A.G., Maloney, W.A. and McLaughlin, A.M. (1994) ‘Characterizing Agricultural 
Policy-Making’, Public Administration, 72, 505-26 
Jordan, A.G., Halpin, D. Maloney, W. (2004) ‘Defining Interests: Disambiguation and 
the Need for New Distinctions?’ The British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 6 (2), 195–212 
Keating, Michael (2005a) The Government of Scotland: Public Policy Making after 
Devolution. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
Keating, M. (2005b) ‘Higher education in Scotland and England after devolution’, 
Regional and Federal Studies, 15, 4, 423-35 
Keating, M. and Stevenson, L. (2001) ‘Submission to The Scottish Parliament Procedures 
Committee Inquiry into CSG proposals and their implementation’ 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/historic/procedures/reports-
03/prr03-03-01.htm  
Keating, M., Cairney, P. and Hepburn, E. (2008) ‘Territorial Policy Communities and 
Devolution in the United Kingdom’ PSA Territorial Politics conference, Edinburgh, 
January 2008 http://www.pol.ed.ac.uk/events/conferences/psaterr2008/submitted_papers  
Kendall, J. (2000) ‘The Mainstreaming of the Third Sector into Public Policy in England 
in the Late 1990s’, Policy and Politics, 28, 4, 541-62 
Kriesi, H., Adam, S. and Jochum, M. (2006) ‘Comparative analysis of policy networks in 
Western Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13, 3, 341-361 
Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (London: 
Yale University Press) 
Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy (London: Yale University Press) 
 39 
Maloney, W.A., Jordan, A.G. and McLaughlin, A.M. (1994) “Interest Groups and Public 
Policy: The Insider/ Outsider Model Revisited”, Journal of Public Policy, 14, 1, 17-38 
Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W., eds (1992a) Implementing Thatcherite Policies 
(Buckingham: Open University Press) 
Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W (1992b) “Policy Communities and Issue Networks: 
Beyond Typology” in  (eds) Marsh,D. and Rhodes, R.A.W. Policy Networks in British 
Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Marsh, D., Richards, D. and Smith, M.J. (2001) Changing Patterns of Governance in the 
United Kingdom (London: Palgrave) 
McConnell, A. (2004) Scottish Local Government (Edinburgh University Press) 
McGarvey, N. and Cairney, P. (2008) Scottish Politics (London: Palgrave) 
McPherson, A.M. and Raab, C.D. (1988) Governing Education: a Sociology of Policy 
Since 1945  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press) 
Page, E. (1999) ‘The insider/ outsider distinction: an empirical investigation’, British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 1, 2, 205-14 
Page, E. (2006) ‘How Policy Is Really Made’, Public Management and Policy 
Association http://personal.lse.ac.uk/Pagee/Papers/PMPA%20Ed%20Page%202006.pdf  
Rhodes, R.A.W. (2005) ‘Everyday Life in a Ministry’, The American Review of Public 
Administration, 35, 1, 3-25 
Richards, D. and Smith, M. (2004) “The ‘Hybrid State’: Labour’s response to the 
Challenge of Governance” in (eds) Ludlam, S. and Smith, M Governing as New Labour 
(London: Palgrave) 
 40 
Richardson, J.J. (1982) ‘Convergent Policy Styles in Europe?’ in (ed) Richardson (1982) 
Policy Styles in Western Europe (London: Allen and Unwin) 
Richardson, J.J. (2000) ‘Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change’, Political 
Studies, 48, 1006-25 
Richardson, J.J., Gustafsson, G. and Jordan, G. (1982) ‘The Concept of Policy Style’ in 
(ed) Richardson (1982) Policy Styles in Western Europe (London: Allen and Unwin) 
Rose, R. (1986) “Steering the Ship of State: On Rudder but Two Pairs of Hands”, 
Appendix 15 of HC 92-II (1986) Civil Servants and Ministers: Duties and 
Responsibilities, Seventh Report from the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Session 
1985-86 
Scottish Constitutional Convention (1995) Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right 
http://www.almac.co.uk/business_park/scc/  
Scottish Executive (2001) A Teaching Profession for the 21
st
 Century 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/158413/0042924.pdf  
Smithers, R. (12.9.05) ‘Teaching unions unite to call for review of school tests’ The 
Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/sep/12/schools.sats  
SPICE (2006) School Education Policy – Subject Profile, Spice Briefing 06/12 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/briefings-06/SB06-12.pdf  
Stoker, G. (2004) Transforming Local Governance: From Thatcherism to New Labour 
(London: Palgrave) 
Wincott, D. (2005) ‘Devolution, Social Democracy and Policy Diversity in Britain’, in 
(eds) J. Adams and K. Schmueker Devolution in Practice 2006 (Newcastle: IPPR North) 
 
 41 
 
                                                 
1
 Thanks to Michael Keating, Scott Greer, Richard Rose, Darren Halpin and three anonymous referees for 
comments on a previous draft.  Particular thanks to Grant Jordan for comments on every draft! 
2
 The larger project now draws on over 300 interviews conducted between 1999-2007.  Two rounds of 
interviews in Scotland were supported by the ESRC’s Devolution and Constitutional Change Programme, 
grant held by Professor Michael Keating (Keating, 2005).  Interviews in Wales in 2005 and England in 
2006 were supported by the University of Aberdeen (Cairney).  Ongoing research in Northern Ireland is 
supported by a Nuffield Small Grant (Cairney and Keating – see Keating et al, 2008).   
3
 The article uses ‘UK’ to avoid confusion with governing practices in English regions. 
4
 Education unions in England and Wales: the Association of Teachers and Lecturers, Association of 
School and College Leaders, Professional Association of Teachers and National Association of 
Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers, National Union Teachers and National Association of Head 
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